Battle of the Palms

At the beginning of Nov. the Italian Government had considered the possibility of extending the theatre of war, by sea at least, in the hope of inducing Turkey to give up the struggle. AustriaHungary intervened, backed by Germany, and on receipt of a report of Italian activity off Salonika, Count Aehrenthal told the Italian ambassador in Vienna that Italian action" on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or in the Aegean Islands could not be allowed either by Austria or by Germany, as it would be contrary to the Treaty of Alliance."
He said further that he considered" the bombardment of ports in European Turkey such as Salonika, Kavalla, etc., as contrary to Article VII."(of the Alliance). Italy's action being limited in this way, it was necessary to solve the Tripoli problem directly, but the task was more difficult than it need have been owing to other limitations laid upon the military authorities by the Italian Government. Gen. Caneva's orders appear to have been that he must not risk (carabinieri the most useless police in Europe, these are military police who unlike the UK act as civvy police)reverses or suffer heavy loss. 

In the circumstances a desert expedition in pursuit of the Turks and their mobile auxiliaries seemed hardly practical. In any event, the four months following the battle of 'Ain Zara passed without any action of importance in Tripolitana. A flying column sent southwards from 'Ain Zara on Dec. 1919 had a stiff fight near Bir Tubras. The oasis of Gargaresh, 2 m. west of Tripoli, was occupied on Jan. 20, after a skirmish with a body of Arabs who came up from the south when the Italians advanced into the open. Five weeks later the situation at Horns was improved by the capture and retention against counterattack of the Mergheb, a hill which dominates the little town. No other fighting took place in the western province until the spring was nearly over, though in Feb. the arrival of camels, motor lorries and Eritrean askaris seemed to point to an early advance.

During the period of inaction the relations between Italy and France came under a cloud. On Jan. 15 and 18, respectively, the French mail steamers" Carthage "and" Manouba,"en route from Marseilles to Tunis, were stopped and brought into Cagliari by Italian cruisers. The grounds given were that the" Carthage "was carrying an aeroplane destined for the Turks, and that a Red Crescent Mission which was on board the" Manouba "included several Turkish officers. The French Prime Minister, M. Poincare, made a speech that was exceedingly sharp in tone, and the press of both countries heaped fuel on the flames kindled by the incident. The matter was referred to The Hague, where the verdict was given in favour of Italy, but M. Poincare's speech and the threats of the French press were not forgotten by Italian public opinion.

In Cyrenaica progress had been no more speedy than in the region of Tripoli. No effort, in fact, had been made to advance towards the interior, or even to extend the area of occupation round Bengazi, Derna and Tobruk. Nothing, certainly, was to be gained by an advance into the blank desert behind Tobruk, and it was decided to make no move from Bengazi and Derna. Enver Bey succeeded in reaching Cyrenaica early in the winter, and by his energy and personality he succeeded in organizing a formidable resistance, securing a unity among the tribesmen, and a willingness to cooperate with the Turks, which had never before existed. Under Enver's direction both Bengazi and Derna, but especially the latter, were closely beset throughout the winter. The Derna lines, which were dominated from the hilly ground immediately behind the town, were harassed frequently, and between the end of Dec. and the first week in March four important attacks were delivered at intervals of about three weeks. All these attacks were repulsed after hard fighting, and the result of the engagement of March 3, in which the attack was directed by Enver Bey in person, seemed to convince the Turks and Arabs that their attempts were useless. The neighbourhood of Derna remained quiet for nearly five months. At Bengazi, except for one reconnaissance in force at the end of Nov. when an Italian column went out some 6 m. from the town and returned after a sharp fight, there was no action of any importance till March. Blockhouses were built to secure the Italian lines, and these were occasionally attacked, but the Italians made no movement until March 12, when Gen. Briccola, who commanded the garrison, sent out a column to attack a large body of Arabs who had occupied an oasis, or rather a collection of gardens, known as the Two Palms, less than half-a-mile from one of the Italian redoubts.

A mixed force of Turks and Arabs also approached the town from the south-east, but did not press home their attack. The Arabs in the oasis stood firm, but they were overwhelmed by the Italian attack and suffered very heavily.

After the battle of the Two Palms there was practically no fighting in the Bengazi district, but in April the long spell of inaction in the western province came to an end, and from that time onward the resistance of the Turks and Arabs was gradually broken by a series of operations at various points.to make italian colonial troops use marx american troops or french in puttees and substtitute with aip heads

first fly boy with a bomb libyan war

The attack of Oct. 23 was followed three days later by another. The Turks and Arabs who attacked in the eastern oasis were beaten off after some hours' fighting, but south of the town the line was rushed by a large body of Arabs who penetrated into the gardens and were dislodged with difficulty by the reserves. For a short time the situation was anxious, but after about five hours' fighting the attacking tribesmen were driven off, leaving many dead. This fight showed that the line occupied was too long for the number of troops available, and it was reduced in extent by a considerable withdrawal in the eastern oasis. This withdrawal was made the subject of alarmist rumours in the European press and many thought that Tripoli would shortly be retaken; and the United States cruiser" Chester "was sent with orders to embark the American consul and any other American subjects. The consul declined to go, and his action was of value in indicating the true situation. No doubt, in addition to frightening Europe, the withdrawal encouraged the Turks and Arabs, who appeared to be in the position of besieging Tripoli. For a month the town did give the impression of being beleaguered; in reality, during this period, Gen. Caneva's chief enemy was cholera. 

The disease broke out towards the end of Oct. and for some weeks it caused much loss and still more anxiety. In all, nearly a thousand soldiers died of cholera, and the native population suffered heavily. The problem of tackling the epidemic was rendered more difficult by the large number of" immigrants "from the oasis, who had sought refuge in the town in the early days of the occupation, or had been brought in when the oasis was cleared. Prompt and effective measures were taken, but it was not until the middle of Nov. that the authorities could breathe freely, and for some weeks the situation required vigilance.

From the events of Oct. 23 and the following days it was clear that the calculations of the Italian Government had been at fault. Turkey was not prepared to lose the Tripolitan provinces without a struggle, and the local tribesmen were joining in the resistance of the garrison. Reinforcements were immediately dispatched to Tripoli, and on Nov. 5 a decree was published in Rome, annexing the two Turkish provinces. Italy was no longer inclined to consider a compromise, and the annexation was proclaimed in order to stop all efforts in that direction and define her intentions, not only to Turkey, but to the European Powers. 

Further reinforcements followed, and by the fourth week in Nov. Gen. Caneva had under his command 34 battalions of infantry (nearly 25,000 rifles) and 16 batteries of field and mountain artillery. On Nov. 26 an advance was made through the oasis on the east and the old lines were occupied after stiff fighting. Eight days after, on Dec. 4, a force of 12,000 men, with five mountain batteries and two squadrons, supported from the trenches by field guns and a few heavy guns which had arrived some days earlier, advanced into the plain against the main body of the enemy, which was based upon the little oasis of 'Ain Zara. It was hoped that the Turks would stand, but this was not their policy. They fought a stubborn containing action, and lost the few guns they possessed, but they retreated in good time, leaving to the quick-moving tribesmen the task of delaying the Italian advance. 'Ain Zara was occupied in force by the Italians, and Turkish headquarters were established at 'Aziziya, some 30 m. south of Tripoli, while a strong force, mainly Arab, was encamped at Suani Beni Adham, a day's march from the town. The eastern oasis was deserted by the Arabs, and its farthest point, Tajura, was occupied by the Italians on Dec. 13.

Giulio Gavotti was one of the pioneers of aviation and maybe the first flyer in a war 

born 17 ottobre 1882
. In November 1910  he was awarded a pilots brevet and flew a Farman plane
In 1911 at Ain zara he launched a grenade on the turk army
This is believed to be the first action in war while flying a plane

kill everyone . libyan war

There was much excitement in the town during the morning, and a few Italian soldiers were killed,below 54mm newsagent soldier, buyable every two weeks, representing one of the sailors who attacked tripoli one of them by a kavass of the German Consulate. Alpini badgeThe streets were rapidly cleared, and there was a good deal of firing by the troops, mostly in the air. 

A few Arabs were shot out of hand, and the kavass . above mentioned was executed after a summary trial. In the oasis, not only to the east of the town, but behind the southern lines, sniping went on all day, and the order was given that the oasis within the Italian lines should be cleared of its inhabitants, and that those found in arms against the Italians should be shot. The oasis was cleared during the next few days, and several thousand Arabs were brought into the town.

 There was a good deal of sniping, especially at first, and those who were found in possession of arms were either shot or brought into Tripoli under guard. Undoubtedly, innocent persons were killed during these days, but they were not very many, and most of them were shot by mistake in the confused bush fighting that succeeded the first inrush at Shara Shat. In all, according to the figures furnished by the Arab authorities, a little over 400 inhabitants of the oasis lost their lives. There were some cases of excess on the part of the Italian troops. Careful subsequent investigation showed that they were very few.carabinieri

The European press, and especially that of England and Germany, was filled with messages which multiplied the number of Arabs killed by ten, and assumed that they were practically all unarmed and harmless peasants. 

It was soon realized that there had been gross exaggeration, and European opinion changed, but the fact that the repression had been severe, and that some innocent persons had been killed, was exploited to the utmost by the Turks in Tripoli and their supporters. Many men of the Tripoli district fought against Italy for a year in the mistaken belief that their families had been massacred.